We introduce a new interpretation of two re lated notions -conditional utility and utility independence. Unlike the traditional inter pretation, the new interpretation render the notions the direct analogues of their prob abilistic counterparts. To capture these no tions formally, we appeal to the notion of util ity distribution, introduced in previous paper.
Introduction
There has recently been a growing interest within AI in representing and reasoning about utility. There are several reasons for this. First, while probabilis tic methods have gained much influence, probability is only one ingredient of decision theory; foundations of decision theory are based on utility functions as much as they are on probability distributions. Second, utility functions of other agents in a bargaining situa tion, and a meal-planning program needing to under stand the gastronomic preferences of the user.
As we argue in previous paper [7] 1 , it would be quite convenient if we had a mechanism analogous to Bayesian networks to reason purely about utilities. As we further note there, at the heart of Bayesian net works lie three concepts: probability distribution, con ditional probability, and probability independence. If we manage to mirror those notions in the case of util ities, we will have potentially availed ourselves of a ready-made mechanism for reasoning about utilities.
In [7] we introduce the notion of utility distribution. 2 Here we concentrate on the notions of conditional util ity and utility independence, and the derived notion of utility networks.
While not the main focus here, as we shall see, this paper does shed some new light on the notion of util ity distribution itself. Specifically, while the treatment in [7] derives the notion from scratch, as a side effect of considering notions such as utility independence we will end up re-deriving the notion of utility distribution as an extension of standard decision theoretic notions, in particular those encountered in multiattribute util ity theory (MAUT) [5, 3] .
Indeed, most papers in AI that attempt to do some thing interesting with utilities appeal to MAUT, and to notions of conditionalization and independence therein. This is true of earlier work on influence di agrams that introduces multiple (additive or multi plicative) value nodes [6] , and more recent papers by Bacchus and Grove [1] and by Doyle and Wellman [2] .
I think that there are two reasons why researchers have concentrated on the classical notions of condi- 1 Despite the publication dates, [7] describes work car ried out almost a year before the work described here.
2We furthermore define the notion of a hi-distribution, which contains both a probability and utility distribution, but this will not play a major role in this paper.
tiona! utility and utility independence. First, the de cision theoretic literature itself (most notably, Keeney and Raiffa's [5] ) presents compelling arguments in fa vor of these notions. Second, the terms themselves suggest an analogy with conditional probability and probabilistic independence, leading to this vague hope that the utility-based notions will yield similar com putational advantages.
The decision theory literature reinforces the anal ogy between the probabilistic and utilitarian notions. Here's a quote from [5] :
One of the fundamental concepts of multi attribute utility theory is that of utility in dependence. Its role in multiattribute utility theory is similar to that of probabilistic inde pendence in multivariate probability theory. (p.224) I argue that this analogy is misleading. The classical sense of utility independence has fundamentally dif ferent properties from those of probabilistic indepen dence. However, there exists a different sense of utility independence for which this analogy holds in a precise sense. The same is true of conditional utility.
Let me illustrate these two senses of conditional utility through an example. Referring to the hypothetical meal-planning program mentioned above, consider two conditional utilities:
• The utility for John of having beef for the main course, given that the appetizer is salmon mousse.
• The utility for John of having beef for the main course, given that John is vegetarian.
These are fundamentally different senses of conditional utility. The first conditions on an objective fact; loosely speaking, it can be thought of updating the utility based on information learned about the state of the world. The second conditions on a mental fact; loosely speaking, it can be thought of as updating the utility based on information learned about the prefer ence structure of the agent. We might call the first 'objective' conditional utility, and the second 'subjec tive' conditional utility.
An analogy may be instructive here. The KR and database communities have learned to distinguish be tween updating a knowledge base and revising it [4] ; the first reflects changes in the world, the second changes in information about the world. A similar distinction must be drawn with respect to conditional utilities.
The standard notion of conditional utility (and derived notions of utility independence) in decision theory is of the first variety, and it is the one commonly discussed in AI. However, this version of conditional utility is the one least similar to conditional probability. Perhaps for this reason, and despite great ingenuity on the part of the various authors, this notion has not yielded a computational device similar in nature and power to Bayesian networks. 3
In the rest of this paper we do the following. First, we briefly review the basics of MAUT and the stan dard notion of utility independence (and conditional utility). Next we extend those notions to include the notion of utility distribution. We then formally present the alternative notions of utility independence and conditional utility, which are directly analogous to their probabilistic counterparts. We conclude with an a computational application of these ideas, and intro duce the notion of utility networks. Every utility function is defi ned over a set of states, and maps each state to a real value (its utility).
In multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [3, 5] one posits a set of n attributes with corresponding domains D1, D2, .. . , Dn, and the set of states is defined to be the Cartesian product Dt x D2 x ... x Dn.
In general, specifying a MAU function can be expen sive, exponential in the number of attributes. How ever, under special conditions the representation can be more compact. The general scheme for specifying these conditions goes like this: One defines certain "in dependence conditions" on the n attributes, and then provides a "representation theorem," stating that un der these independence conditions the utility function can be specified in a certain compact form. The re mainder of this section summarizes these conditions and corresponding specialized representations.
We first note that a utility function u over a set of states S induces a preference ordering �u on lotteries (or probability distributions) over S via the expected utility construct:
where Pt and p2 are any two lotteries over S. More generally, in the case of MAU functions, a utility func- Using the notion of utility independence we define two independence conditions on a set of attributes. The first definition doesn't appear in the literature as a definition or given this name, but these will be conve nient:
Definition 2 (based on [5] , p.293) Attributes X1, ... , Xn are singulary utility independent if every X; is utility independent of X;.
The next definition involves stronger independence conditions:
.. , Xn are mutually utility independent if every subset of {X 1, .. . , Xn} is utility independent of its complement.
The third and final type of independence involves a stronger condition than either of the first two:
.. , Xn are additive independent if preferences over lotteries on X 1, ... , Xn depend only on their margmal probability distributions and not on their joint probability distri bution.
The relative strength of these three properties is re flected in the different representation theorems they allow. Starting off somewhat qualitatively, here is a rough description of four special forms of MAU func tions that are based on these three independence con ditions.
The fi rst column specifies the independence condition on attributes, the second column names the special form in which the utility function can be represented, and the third gives some properties of this special form: 
It is easy to verify that H is utility independent of W, Definition 6 Given a vector of boolean attrib utes X= x1, ... ,Xn {that is, each with domain {0,1}), a utility function u over X is TIOLI ("take it or leave it") iff there exists constants k1, ... , kn such that u(x1, ... , Xn ) = Ef=l kiXi.
The interpretation of a TIOLI utility function is best explained through our modified example. Health con tributes 2 to one's joy (or utility or satisfaction), Wealth contributes 1, and the total utility experi enced in any given state is simply the sum of the joys supplied by the elements present in the stateu(HW) = 2+ 1 = 3, u(HW) = 2+ 0 = 2, and so on. I
will call the attributes of a TIOLI MAU function util ity factors or simply factors, to denote the fact they are thought of as representing the basic ingredients of one's mental state of satisfaction.
It is worthwhile to mention here that MAUT is com pletely agnostic about the interpretation of attributes.
In some examples each attribute is some good such as sugar or flour, its value denote the quantity of the Definition 7 Given a vector of boolean attributes X = X1, .. . , Xn, a utility function u over X is a utility distribution iff there exists constants k1, . . . , kn such that {a) 0 � k; � 1, (b) L:j=1k; = 1, and {c) u (x1, ... ,xn ) = Ej=1kiX;.
Clearly, the structure of a utility distribution is essen tially that of a probability distribution, except that the measure is applied to utility factors rather than to events. In fact, all that remains in order to make the two measures identical in structure is to lift the domain of the utility distribution to sets of factors.
This is done in the obvious way; the utility of a set of factors is the sum of the individual utilities.4
The notion of utility distribution was introduced al ready in a previous paper [7] , where it was defined in dependently of any pre-existing notion. I've re-derived the notion here in the context of multiattribute utility theory in order to be able to contrast different senses of, e.g., utility independence in the next section, but let me briefly mention here a few more elements dis cussed in [7] .
The reader might be concerned about the applicabil ity of these notions. We have discussed a progression of increasingly strong constraints on the structure of the utility function, and one might worry that the 4We have seen that some standard special forms of MAU functions -in particular, the additive form -come with a representation theorem, stating necessary and suf ficient conditions on the preference relation over lotteries that permit the special form in question. One might ask if similar necessary and sufficient conditions exist for TIOLI functions or utility distributions. This is a question that I haven't looked into closely thus far, but it seems that there do not exist simple, compact conditions. Obviously, a necessary condition is that the preference among lotteries depend only on the marginals, but it seems that the ad ditional requirements needed to make this also a sufficient condition are not as neat. However, given my preliminary state of understanding, and the fact that this question will not play a role in the sequel, I won't pursue this further here.
strongest constraint -the utility distribution form-is too rare to be of interest. It turns out that this is not so, at least in principle. For any utility function-even one not in MAU form-we can find a set of factors and a utility distribution over them, such that original util ity function can be reconstructed from these factors.
The only hitch is that the set of factors might not be as small as one would like. In the examples given above (the health/wealth, and the cars examples) the num ber of factors was logarithmic in the number of states.
However, in general it will range between logarithmic and linear.
I have not discussed here how one can combine probability distributions and utility distributions into one framework. In [7] I define the notion of a hi distribution. Briefly, a hi-distribution is a structure consisting of a probability distribution and a utility distribution, with undirected arcs connecting some fac tors with some states. What is important to emphasize here is that one cannot in general define a probability distribution and a utility distribution on the same set.
In effect, when one carves up the world into a set of elements, one usually makes a choice -these elements can be additive in probability (in which case they are called ' states ') or additive in utility (in which case they are called ' factors ' ) , but not both. However, given two such different sets of elements, one can define a third set by taking the Cartesian product of the first two.
The elements in this induces set are additive in both probability and utility, but do not typically correspond to an intuitive concept. Let's start with conditional utility. In the subjective version of the notion, we interpret u(x]y) as "the utility of x, given that u(y) = 1, or, that all the utility is derived from the factor set y."
This can be explained intui tively through an example. Consider a person whose entire value system is based on owning any or all of three cars, a Rolls Royce, a Maserati, and a Ford. We define three correspond ing utility factors, with the k;s defined by u(r) = 0. 
Subjective utility independence will also be defined similarly; factor set x will be said to be utility independent of y iff u(x]y) = u(x). The intuition behind this property will be that the relative contri bution of the factor set x does not change if we learn that the entire contribution to joy lies within the set then it's easy to verify that the utility of the class of cars made in English-speaking countries is indepen dent of the utility of European-made cars:
u(fr]rm) = tt(fr) = 0.66 ...
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Utility networks
Our goal at the outset was to investigate the possibility of endowing utilities with the properties of probabili ties, so that the benefit of Bayesian networks can trans fer to them. We've now achieved this, so it might be ar gued that the rest of the story is anti-climactic. Since now we have notions of ut ility distribution, conditional utility, and utility independence that have exactly the mathematical properties of their probabilistic counter parts, we can, it might be argued, go ahead and use Bayesian networks to represent and reason about util ities. (Of course, the term Bayesian networks should now be replaced by something more appropriate. We might use terms utility network, or u-net, when we are using the Bayesian-network-like structure for utilities, and p-net in the case of probabilities.)
Left at this, however, this might be deemed little more than a formal exercise. There are at least two sources I don't know whether utility factors will in general turn out to be intuitive or not; I think we don't have enough experience to pronounce judgement on this. However, we do not need to reason about factors directly. This is exactly analogous to probabilistic reasoning. Bayesian networks do not represent individual world states; in any realistic domain, these would be impossibly com plex for any human to comprehend. Rather, each vari able represents an event, a set of states, which ab stracts away from all but a few aspects of the world.
The events "it rained," "the lawn was watered," and "the pavement is wet," are examples of such abstrac tions. We will do the same with factors, and reason only about sets of factors, such as "having money,"
"being admired by a loved one," and "owning a mo When a given set of factors and a given event define each other, they are co-extensive.
Detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of the The way to interpret this picture is as follows. The person whose utility is modeled has two basic moti vators -love of BMW GS-PD motorcycles, and love of art. In service of the GS-PD motivator, the per son place a certain value on owning one of these bikes, and on reading Dirt Bike magazine, which covers dual purpose motorcycles such as the GS-PD. The Art mo tivator leads him to desire to go to SFMOMA, as well as to own an original de Kooning. Both the consider ation of owning a GS-PD and that of owning the de Kooning lead the person to place a certain value on money. The graph structure induces various indepen dence conditions. For example, the utility of money given that the person wishes to purchase a GS-PD is independent of his love of motorcycles.
This is presumably a natural and familiar pattern. In deed, it is a causal pattern, but one must be care ful about the nature of this causal relation. Consider again the link between Art and SFMOMA. There are at least three causal connections one might be tempted to identify here. First, satisfying the SFMOMA desire will cause the higher satisfaction of the desire for Art. Second, the desire for Art will cause the person to de sire to visit SFMOMA. Third, the desire for Art will cause the person to actually visit SFMOMA . In utility networks, the links capture the first two kinds of causal ity, but not the third. Utility networks do not speak about what will be the case, only about a person's mental state. Indeed, whether the person will actually visit the museum might be determined by factors that are unrelated to the person's preference structure, just as even the most intense interest in the GS-PD will not necessarily result in the person buying one.
This is not to say that mental state doesn't impact re ality, only that utility network don't capture this fact. Although this lies beyond the scope of this paper, let me add a few words on reasoning simultaneously about probabilities and utilities, in a structure we might call a bi-network. I've mentioned already that in [7] I de fine a hi-distribution, which couples a probability dis tribution (or p-distribution) with a utility distribution (or u-distribution) . We can represent a hi-distribution by a pair of networks, a Bayesian network (or p-net) and a utility network (or u-net). If the two were un related that wouldn't be interesting, but in fact a hi distribution includes a set of undirected edges between nodes in the two distributions, which can be used to induce utilities on the p-net and probabilities on the u-net.
In a simple version of hi-networks, computation in each net will proceed independently; in particular, we can condition the two nets independently from one an other. Just as influence diagrams use utility nodes merely to compute values resulting from the proba bilistic conditioning, in simple hi-networks links will be used to merely compute expected-utility values re sulting from both probabilistic and utilitarian condi tioning.
A more ambitious version of hi-networks will allow "hybrid" forms of conditioning, in which the p-net and the u-net share nodes, and, more interestingly, one can condition probabilities on utilities and vice versa.
However, this remains an avenue for future investiga tion.
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Summary
The ideas described in this paper are part of a con tinuing enquiry into the role of choice theory in AI, and the questioning of some established assumptions in choice theory. The main messages synthesized so far as a result of this inquiry are as follows:
• There is no reason for the traditional asymmetries between probabilities and utilities. In particular, utilities too can enjoy distributions. This is the main focus of [7] , and was discussed here only partially,
• There exists a sense of conditional utility that is different from the classical one, and utility dis tributions provide a way to define it. The. same is true of utility independence. This has been the primary focus of this paper. For this reason, the related work discussed throughout the paper is mostly that which pertains to utility indepen dence.
• The interpretation of classical results in decision theory, and in particular the von Neumann and Morgenstern representation theorem, is opened to question. This is discussed in [7] but not here.
• Utility networks can do for utilities what Bayesian networks do for probabilities, with the concept of teleology replacing that of causality. This was discussed in the previous section.
• The new perspective suggests a structure, called a hi-distribution, in which probability and util ity distributions live side by side, and which can be used to compute expected utilities. This too is discussed in [7] but only mentioned here, with brief discussion of how it suggests the notion of hi-networks as a generalization of both Bayesian networks and utility networks.
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